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ALLOCATION OF LOSS AND PROPERTY INSURANCE
JOHN C. McCoID It
I. THE PROBLEM
The troublesome problem of a possible double recovery by an
insured owner of property invites renewed analysis. The problem arises
when I, the insured owner, has a claim against his insurance company
and likewise one against T, a third party. The latter claim may accrue
for a variety of reasons, e.g., because T negligently destroyed a building
or because T had agreed to buy it before a fire damaged it. Should I
recover damages for T's negligence on the full purchase price and also
receive payment from the insurance company? If not, how is the loss
to be adjusted? If I is to be deprived of his "windfall," who is to
benefit?'
Resolution of the issue, which appears in an array of factual con-
texts,2 varies with context and court. No less than five solutions, none
of them altogether satisfactory, have been advanced. Following a state-
ment of these solutions and their supporting and opposing arguments,
an approach will be suggested which places the insurance contract in a
more realistic perspective. The central issue is not simply the technical
problem of insurance law stated; it is rather one of fixing risk of loss
between I and T. To that issue the possibility and desirability of
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. The problem is not limited to property insurance cases; it extends to insurance
of the person. See, e.g., Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713
(1954) ; Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1964) ; Kimball
& Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MIcir. L. REv. 841 (1962). The
decision to limit this paper to property insurance situations was dictated by the fact
that, along with other distinctions, indemnity for property loss is more easily fixed
than for personal injury. Indemnity is therefore a principle generally regarded as
fundamental in property insurance. Godfrey, Some Limited Interest Problems, 15
LAW & CONTEmp. PRoB. 415, 417 (1950). Even in that field acceptance of the principle
is not universal. See, e.g., Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 App.
Div. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E2d 268 (1948).
2. In addition to the negligence and executory contract for the sale of realty cases,
an only partial listing would include: sale of personalty, mortgage, landlord-tenant,
bailment and derivative and absolute liability cases.
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insurance coverage of the loss, i.e., the insurance contract, is relevant,
more so than has always been recognized. So considered, it should
produce a more rational allocation of risk of loss and the elimination
of a difficult insurance problem.
I. THE SOLUTIONS
Five ultimate solutions to the problem initially stated are possible:
(A) The insured may be allowed to collect from both his insurer and
the third party; (B) Although the insured may be limited to indemnifica-
tion for his loss, the source of recovery may be left to his choosing;
(C) Loss may be apportioned between the insurer and the third party;
(D) Loss may be allocated entirely to the insurer; (E) It may be placed
completely on the third party.' Many of the cases, while involving the
problem, do not require its resolution.' However, examples of all of the
solutions except C are to be found in the decisions, and, although no
case finally' adopting C has been noted, it has been urged by more than
one commentator. 6
The diversity of solutions to the problem is attributable to two
factors. Courts, failing to recognize the common thread, generally tend
to examine the question only in terms of the fact situation before them.7
For instance, mortgage cases are decided without reference to the treat-
ment of landlord-tenant problems. Moreover, and this may be the
reason for the category-by-category approach, each of the possible solu-
tions is subject to serious objection. One solution may better commend
itself in one context than in another.
3. Solutions A, D and E are regularly listed by the commentators. See KEETON,
BASIC INSURANCE LAW 205 (1960) ; Godfrey, supra; note 1, at 419-20. Largely ignored
by them but appearing with some regularity in the decisions is solution B. E.g., Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 219 Md. 217, 148 A.2d 453 (1959). Solution C appears in
King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 62, 65-66
(1951) ; Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems its the Law of Suretyship and
Insurance, 47 HARv. L. REv. 976 (1934).
4. E.g., Foley v. Manufacturers' & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E.
318 (1897). There the insured simply maintained an initial suit against the insurer.
No ultimate allocation was required by the case presented; however, the court seemed
to concede the possibility that the insured would recover from both insurer and third
party. See Note, 35 So. CAL. L. Rv. 501, 503-04 (1962).
5. Application of this solution by a trial court was reversed on appeal in favor
of solution E. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago Tunnell Terminal Co., 12 Ill. App.2d
539, 139 N.E.2d 770 (1958).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. A rare exception is In the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111
(N.D. Cal. 1958) (sale of personalty case adopting solution D in preference to A
and E). It has been suggested that even that court's frame of reference was too
narrow. See PAir-asox & YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 190 (4th
ed. 1961).
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A. Collection from Both Insurer and Third Party
Examples of collection by the insured from both a property insurer
and the third party seem to be confined to cases where the latter's liability
to the insured is contractual. Probably this is explained by the almost
uniform acceptance in this country of the principle of subrogation of a
property insurer to the insured's rights against third-party tortfeasors,
a principle which represents solution E noted above.'
With that qualification, however, no particular regard for factual
category is displayed. In Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co.9 the third party was a landlord, who was obligated by the lease
to repair fire damage and did so; the insured tenant nonetheless was
allowed to recover from his insurer. The court reasoned that the tenant's
insurer had made an absolute promise to pay and not simply an agree-
ment to indemnify. In a Seventh Circuit case the court refused to credit
the condermnee's insurance against the condemnation award for a build-
ing. Accordingly, the condemnee recovered from both insurer and
condemnor."0 The solution was justified on the ground that the insurance
contract was personal to the named insured.
The argument which underlies these decisions allowing an insured
to collect from both insurer and third party stems from the fact that
the insured has two, independent contractual rights for which he has
given valuable consideration. Having "paid" for both rights, he now
should be entitled to realize on them. Indeed, any other approach will
produce a windfall for either the insurer or the third party. Accordingly,
each right is to be handled as if the other did not exist.
This reasoning loses its appeal when it is realized that it produces
a rule which permits double recovery by the insured. Double recovery is
generally avoided in our law on the same principle as that of unjust
enrichment, and it is particularly obnoxious where insurance, or at least
insurance of property, is involved. 1 The same policies that lead to the
requirement of an insurable interest, however broadly a requisite interest
S. See 2 RIcrARDs, INSURANCE § 185 (5th ed. 1952). For a discussion of this
solution, see notes 48-70 infra and accompanying text.
9. 272 App. Div. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d
268 (1948). Accord, Citizens Ins. Co. v. Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1955).
10. Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1959).
11. Godfrey, supra note 1, at 420; King, supra note 3, at 71; Note, 28 COLUm. L.
R xv. 202 (1928); Note, supra note 4, at 505. It is the principle of indemnity which
makes double recovery obtrusive. Keeton, op. cit. supra note 3, at 205. It has been
suggested that the principle is no more than a manifestation of the policy against
wagering. Harnett & Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic
Reevaluation of a Legal Contcept, 48 COLUm. L. ,ZRv. 1162, 1183 (1948). It is occasionally
urged that property insurance is not limited to indemnity. Cf. Federowicz v. Potomac
Ins Co., 7 App. Div.2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1959).
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is defined, apply here. The'prospect of double recovery may lead to
wagering by the insured, which is said to be socially unproductive.
It may lead-to the temptation, at the same time too great to resist yet
too devious to expose, of the insured himself to effect the loss." And
where the third party and the insurer are free from fault no useful
purpose is served by allowing the 'insured more than indemnification.
It is hardly surprising that collection by the insured from both insurer
and third party to the extent that it produces double recovery had little
appeal" and is therefore the least commonly found of the five solutions.
B. Indemnification From a Source Selected by the Named Insured
It is quite a different matter to give the insured rights against
both insurer and third party but to limit him to indemnification and to
leave the choice of its source to him. Under this solution the insured
may proceed against either, and, recovery from one, if it amounts to
indemnification, discharges the other.
Again, cases adopting this course seem limited to situations where
the third party's liability is contractual because of application of the
subrogation result in tort cases. Moreover, most of the decisions, and
there are many, are cases excusing the insurer following indemnification
of the insured by the third party,1" although there seems to be no reason
why the third party is not excused by an insurance payment unless it is
that the insurer's obligation is more'obviously limited to indemnification
than the third party's." With these limiting features no particular factual
lines are observed in the cases.
Typically the announced ground of decision excusing the insurer
after the insured has been indemnified by a contractually obligated third
party is that the insured has suffered no loss. This was the announced
basis of decision in the leading case of Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of
No. America6 where, interestingly, there is no indication that the third-
12. Prevention of wagering and guarding against the moral hazard are standard
justifications of the insurable interest requirement. See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF
INSURANCE LAW 109-11 (2d ed. 1957); 1 RiClHARDS, INSURANCE §§ 64-65 (5th ed. 1952).
13. See, e.g., Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 621, 183 S.E. 799
(1935) (subrogation of insurer denied, but double recovery avoided by crediting the
third party with the amount of insurance paid); Home Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, 128
Miss. 282, 91 So. 1 (1922) (to prevent double recovery by insured bailor, insurer
to share in any ultimate recovery from bailee).
14. E.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Baldwin County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 231 Ala. 102, 163
So. 604 (1935) ; Tauriello v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Super. 530, 82 A.2d 226 (1951);
Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 353 S.W.2d 841 (Texas Civ. App.
1962).
15. Cf. In the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958);
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 621, 183 S.E. 799 (1935).
16. 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928).
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party tenant was under any duty to repair although the lease gave him
the privilege of doing so. It was also the rationale in Glens Falls Ins. v.
Sterling7 where a building contractor was contractually liable to the in-
sured who simply failed to prove that he had not been indemnified by the
third party. Occasionally, release of the insurer on these stated grounds
may also be attributable to the insured's destruction of a subrogation right
of the insurer which would otherwise have operated to produce solution
E. An example may be Flint Frozen Foods v. Firemen!s Ins. Co."
where the insurer successfully defended against the third-party-pledgor
to whom the insured pledgee made a post-loss assignment where the loan
for which the property was pledged as security was repaid.
The solution is supportable by analogy to the common-law treat-
ment of joint tortfeasors. Indemnification of the injured party by one
tortfeasor relieved the other of liability. 9 The analogy is imperfect in
the sense that this result in insurance cases does not appear where the
third party is a tortfeasor. More important perhaps is the fact that,
subject to the prohibition of double recovery, this result gives the insured
maximum freedom of contract.
There is much to be said for this freedom in terms of initial indem-
nification of the insured. He has contracted for two sources of com-
pensation. Should he not be allowed to select his own route, guided by
such factors as ease, speed and sureness of recovery as they appear to
him? He may be denied double recovery, but surely the consideration
he has given for these contract rights entitles him to this much. Indeed,
if he pursues one path with no success or only partial satisfaction,
perhaps he must be allowed to try the other as well.2"
To concede this much, however, is not to accept the solution whole-
heartedly, for it does not follow that the matter ends there. Once the
insured has made his choice and has been indemnified, it is still possible
to provide for readjustment between insurer and third party in order
to effect a desired, ultimate allocation of loss. In fact this is exactly
what is done in the subrogation cases, and it has been done where the
insured was first indemnified by the third party and it seemed desirable
that the insurer bear the loss. By leaving ultimate allocation of loss to the
insured, the court abdicates the power to effectuate any policies that
17. 219 Md. 217, 148 A.2d 453 (1959).
18. 8 N.J. 106, 86 A.2d 673 (1952).
19. Although judgment against one tortfeasor no longer bars suit for the same
injuries against another, the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction. PRossER,
TORTS 241-246 (2d ed. 1955).
20. Cf. Union Ins. Soc'y v. Consolidated Ice Co., 261 Mich. 35, 245 N.W. 563
(1932).
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should bear on the matter. Judicial disposition of the controversy be-
comes incomplete. In truth it must be admitted that some of the decisions
cited above must be characterized as incomplete. In both Ramsdell and
Sterling the courts have held no more than that the insured is not entitled
to more than indemnification. They have not said that readjustment
between insured and third party is impossible; they have not been asked
to rule on the point, although it is likely that such would be the ruling.
On the other hand, in Flint the"insurer and the third party are face-to-
face; yet the effect of this decision is unclear. The court may be saying:
let the matter rest as the insured left it or, as already suggested, it may
be saying that loss quite properly belongs to the third party. In all
events, to leave the choice of ultimate loss allocation to the insured is
either to forfeit the power to make a desired allocation or to admit that
there is no basis for making a choice. Neither can be justified. The
forfeiture involves a sin of omission, and there is a more appealing
solution if the admission is sound.
C. Pro-Rating Loss Between Insurer and Third Party
Some form of apportionment of loss between the insurer and the
third party is a natural step beyond leaving ultimate loss allocation in the
hands of the insured. The same reasoning that produces rules permitting
contribution between joint-tortfeasors2" or apportionment of loss between
two insurers22 applies here. If there is no basis for consistent allocation
to one or the other, insurer and third party should share the loss. There
may be some difficulties in determining the appropriate contribution,
but that can be handled, as is apportionment among several insurers
who have assumed risks in varying amounts, by prorating loss in propor-
tion to percentage of risk assumed.
Yet no court seems to have been willing to adopt this approach. 3
The idea of apportioning loss between insurer and third party has been
confined to the commentators. Interestingly, even among the latter the
proposal has been limited to cases where the third party's liability is
absolute, derivative or based on ordinary negligence, cases where the
fifth, subrogation result usually applies. Clearly the impetus for the
proposal is dissatisfaction with the subrogation result as working an
injustice.24 If sound, however, it appears equally justifiable to apply the
21. See PROSSER, TORTS 248 (2d ed. 1955).
22. Apportionment of loss between insurers exists even without a pro rata clause.
That clause goes further and limits from the outset an insurer's liability to his
proportionate share of the loss. 2 RICHAiDS, INSURANCE §§ 175-76 (5th ed. 1952).
23. An abortive attempt by a trial court to do so has been noted. See note 5 supra.
24. See King, supra note 3, at 65, 81 (third party negligent or absolutely liable) ;
Langmaid, supra note 3, at 988, 991-92 (third party vicariously or absolutely liable).
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solution to other cases.
Because of the analogies to contribution and apportionment between
insurers, this result may commend itself more than leaving allocation to
the whim of the insured. But if there is a sound basis for choice, this
solution is wrong. Its weakness, and this may explain lack of judicial
acceptance, is that it is simply a compromise. It can be sustained only on
the premise that there is no rational basis for choice between allocation
to the insurer and to the third party. However, the problem under con-
sideration does not involve two tortfeasors or two insurers; rather, it
concerns an insurer and a third party. Whatever the character of the
latter, he is almost certainly distinguishable from an insurer. The
decisions allocating loss entirely to insurer or entirely to the third party
suggest distinctions which may provide a basis of choice.
D. Placing the Loss on the Insurer
Ultimate allocation of loss entirely to the insurer is comparatively
rare in judicial decisions. It has become commonplace only in cases
involving the sale of realty where the vendor has insured.25 Ordinarily
that result has been justified on the ground that the purchaser has
equitable title to the property and that, the insurance running with the
land, an equitable claim of the purchaser to the insurance proceeds in the
hands of the vendor follows.2" The idea that the purchaser has equitable
title to the property is perhaps too settled to permit doubt. The "jugular
vein" of the argument lies in the idea that the insurance runs with the
land; yet it seems clear that in many respects it does not. If, for example,
I sells property to T and title passes, I's insurance does not cover T's
subsequent loss unless the insurer has assented to an assignment of the
policy." Briefly, the explanation of this legal principle is that, while we
say that the property is insured, in fact it is only I's interest, no longer
in existence, which was insured. One court, dealing with a case involving
the sale of realty, succinctly stated the matter:
The supposed injustice stems from absence of "fault" on the part of the third party
in such cases.
25. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S.W.2d 946 (1929);
PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 151; 1 RiCHrARDS, INSURANCE § 154 (5th ed. 1952) ;
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1402 (1959). Cf. Bruce v. Jennings, 190 Ga. 618, 10 S.E.2d 56
(1940). Contra, Nashville Indus. Corp. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 443 (1931). But
see Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 269, 146 N.E. 630 (1925) (contract put risk
of loss on the vendor).
26. E.g., Millville Aerie v. Weatherby, 82 N.J. Eq. 455, 88 AtI. 847 (1913) ; Dubin
Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
27. PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 210-11; VANcE, INSURANCE 757-61 (3d
ed. 1951). The marine rule is to the contrary. ARNouLD, MAmxE INSURANCE § 175
(14th ed. 1954).
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"These reasons may savor of layman's ideas of equity, but they are
not law. . . . Insurance is a merely personal contract to pay a sum of
money by way of indemnity to protect the interest of the insured.""
If the argument of equitable claim is tenuous in the sale of realty
cases, it is nonexistent in other cases which allocate loss to the insurer,
i.e., give the third party the benefit of the insurance. Yet there are an
increasing number of cases in which this is done.29
This suggests the presence of other considerations justifying the
result. It may, for example, reflect the fact that the third party simply
cannot afford to bear the loss individually, although that is not necessarily
true in all cases. One wonders, for example, in General Mills v. Gold-
man," whether the tenant is not perfectly capable of bearing the loss.
Of course, the court finds it unnecessary to consider that point by
interpreting the lease as relieving the tenant from liability. While no
case has been found in which the decision is expressly based on this
ground, it may have been an unarticulated premise in some.
It is true, however, that in all cases the insurer is, or should be, able
to bear the loss. After all it has been paid a premium for assumption
of the risk, a premium theoretically fixed on the probabilities of the
occurrence of the insured event."' Perhaps a more tenable argument,
then, is the negative one that not to allocate loss to the insurer is to give
it a windfall. 2 This apparently was the basis of decision in In the
Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op.3" where the California federal court, after
rare examination of a variety of cases, declined to allow the insured a
double recovery or to subrogate the insurer to the insured's right and
allocated loss to the insurer "who has been compensated for insuring
against such loss.... ""
28. Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 374, 146 N.E. 630, 632 (1925).
29. See Young, Some "Windfall Coverages" in Property and Liability Insurance,
60 COLUM. L. Rav. 1063 (1960). Professor Young approves this result when: (1) the
claim of the third party is easily identified by the relationship between the insured and
the third party; (2) allowing the claim will not increase the hazard assumed by the
insurer; (3) allowing the claim will not impair the indemnity of the named insured,
and (4) there is a means of preventing an arbitrary choice by the insured between
the insurer and third party. Id. at 1064. The fourth requirement indicates concern
about solution B.
30. 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 (1951) (General
Mills the tenant).
31. See 1 RIcHARDs, INSURANCE § 2 (5th ed. 1952); MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD,
INSURANcE 372 (5th ed. 1961). Actually rate calculation depends more on projected
loss experience. Id. at 372-73.
32. KEET N, op. cit. supra note 3; PATTERSON, op cit. supra note 12, at 151;
Kimball & Davis, supra note 1, at 841; King, supra note 3, at 71; 72 HARV. L. Rv.
1380, 1382 (1959).
33. 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
34. Id. at 116.
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The validity of the windfall argument, however, is debatable.
Clearly the premium is not all windfall, for the insurer has assumed
the risk of a loss for which no third party, or at least no financially
responsible third party, is liable. In the absence of such third party the
insurer is unquestionably obligated to pay. Moreover, if calculation of
the premiums has been based on the assumption that loss will be allocated
to the third party by subrogation of the insurer to the insured's rights
against that party, then there is no windfall at all. The extent to which
that assumption figures in premium computation is unclear. Professor
Patterson has stated that subrogation plays little or no part in rate-
fixing and cites as evidence the fact that there is no premium reduction
in insuring secured creditors, where the subrogation right has obvious
value." Professor Keeton, pointing to the rates charged mortgagees
who insure separately, takes the same position. 6 Yet there is room for
doubt. Failure of the insurer to give premium advantages to mortgagees
and other secured creditors is not dispositive. The savings may have
been distributed on a wider basis-to all insureds. If premiums are fixed
on the basis of losses paid and if the figures reported for losses paid
are adjusted to reflect subrogation recoveries, then allocation of loss to
the third party is not a windfall to the insurer."
But this doubt has not been the usual basis for rejection of
allocation of loss to the insurer by the courts. Rather, the chief stumbling
block has been the principle of "personal contract. 3  Again and again
the courts have declined on this ground to give the third party the benefit
of the insurance, the corollary of allocation of loss to the insurer. In
essence, the argument is that the insurer has not agreed to assume the
third party's risk of liability. Because risk assumption for a fee requires
care in the selection of risks, burdening the insurer with "insureds" not
of its own choosing is improper. This "classical" concept arises from the
fact already noted that, while insurance is on property or against
property losses, it is of people.3" Its rigorous application, however,
ignores the additional fact that insurers under no legal compulsion often
35. PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 151-52.
36. KEEToN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 172. Nor do insurers differentiate in rate
between policies covering only a conditional vendor and policies covering both vendor
and vendee. 72 HARv. L. REv. 1380, 1382 (1959).
37. See Note, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 202 (1928) ; Note, 13 HASTINGS L. J. 474 (1960)
(suggesting that subrogation recoveries are reflected in rate structure).
38. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Therrell, 158 Miss. 810, 131 So. 263 (1930); Brownell
v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925) ; Godfrey, supra note 1, at 420;
Comment, 22 LA. L. REv. 225 (1961) ; Note, 28 COLUM. L. Rv. 202 (1928); 72 HARV.
L. PRv. 1380, 1381 (1959).
39. 1 RiCHAIDs, INSURANCE § 152 (5th ed. 1952). See text accompanying notes
25-28 supra.
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extend coverage to the interests of unknown third parties. Perhaps the
commonest example is coverage of a bailor's interest by appropriate
language in policies issued to a bailee as the named insured.4 Typically
this is done only in cases where the named and therefore known insured
has possession or custody of the property, and the risk involved in
insuring an unknown third party is thereby minimized, if not eliminated.
Judicial extension of coverage to a purchaser under an executory con-
tract for the sale of realty where possession has not changed might be
justified thusly, although there is no language in the policy purporting
to so extend the coverage; in at least one case there was language to
the contrary. 1 There are even infrequent examples of express extension
of coverage to include the interests of unknown third parties in possession
of the property.2
This quarrel with the "personal contract" principle cuts both ways,
however. If it raises doubt as to the practical significance of the concept,
it also suggests a potential solution or a means of eliminating the problem.
The property insurance contract can be drafted so as to expressly extend
the coverage to include the third party's liability interest; at least this
might be done for certain categories of third parties. Insurance contracts
covering both bailee and bailor or mortgagor and mortgagee are ex-
emplary, although in both those cases the insurance is procured by the
one who, in the posture of the problem, would be a third party."'
A further difficulty with allocation of loss to the insurer arises
when the third party separately insures his own interest, a phenomenon
apparently occurring with increasing frequency. Simply to give the third
party the benefit of another's insurance in addition to his own may then
lead to double recovery on his part. This, was the outcome in Vogel v.
Northern Assur. Co.4 where a federal court saw no escape from the
Pennsylvania rule giving the purchaser of realty the benefit of the
40. Ordinarily language indicating an intent to cover the interest of one other
than the named insured is required. Typical is the "held in trust or on commission"
clause. Id. § 162.
41. Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
42. E.g., Hagan v. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 186 U.S. 423 (1902) (covering
purchaser of half-interest in a boat subsequent to issue of the policy; marine insurance).
43. As to coverage of bailees and bailors, see PATTERsoN, op. cit. supra note 12, at
125-30. As to coverage of mortgagors and mortgagees, see VANCE, INSURANCE 773-74
(3d ed. 1951). More than the liability interest of the third party may be covered.
Such policies cover the bailee's interest based on contract right and the mortgagor's
property interest.
44. 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955). From one standpoint this is double recovery by
an insured. The purchaser was indemnified by his insurer and by a third-party vendor,
liable because he had insured.
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vendor's insurance. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Alberstadt,5
the Pennsylvania court subsequently avoided the dilemma by prorating
the loss between vendor's insurer and purchaser's insurer. However
practical as a solution of the particular problem, that device seems con-
trary to firmly ingrained rules on apportionment. Loss is not ordinarily
apportioned between insurers when the two policies cover distinctly
different interests. 6 Still another alternative is to treat one policy as
providing primary coverage and the other as excess." Which policy is
primary and which is treated as excess may create a problem, and in all
events two premiums will have been paid for a single risk. Arguably, it
would be preferable to give the third party the invariable benefit of the
owner's policy.
E. Placing the Loss on the Third Party
Diametrically opposed to allocation of loss to the insurer is a result
placing the loss on the third party. The latter is by far the most commonly
encountered solution in the property insurance cases. Allocation of loss
to third-party tortfeasors s or mortgagor 49 is virtually universal. It is
also the prevailing result when the third party is a purchaser of person-
alty"0 or a common carrier."' Less often in this country, but with perhaps
increasing frequency, it may be found in other fact categories where the
third party's liability is contractual."
45. 303 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83 (1956). Superficially this case appears to be an
example of the apportionment solution. See pt. II, C supra. However, the court
does not indicate that apportionment would have been required had the purchaser been
uninsured, and Pennsylvania precedent, allowing the purchaser the benefit of the
vendor's insurance, is clearly to the contrary. Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of
No. America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949). Apportionment in the Alberstadt case
seems to have been designed solely to prevent double recovery by the third party.
46. Vogel v. Northern Assur. Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3rd Cir. 1955); 2 RicHARDs,
INSURANCE § 175 (5th ed. 1952).
47. KEEroN, op. cit. supra note 3.
48. PATTERsoN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 148; Campbell, Nov-Consensual Surety-
ship, 45 YALE L.J. 69, 76-77 (1935) ; King, supra note 3, at 64.
49. Lockett v. Western Assur. Co., 190 Ark. 1135, 83 S.W.2d 65 (1935) ; Gains-
ville Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 187 Ga. 559, 1 S.E.2d 636 (1939) ; Le Doux v. Dettmering,
316 Ill. App. 98, 43 N.E.2d 862 (1942); PATTERsoN, op. cit. mpra note 12, at 150-51;
Godfrey, supra note 1, at 422; Young, supra note 29, at 1072-74 (noting, however,
some exceptions).
50. See King, supra note 3, at 82; 20 MD. L. Rrv. 161, 165-66 (1960). There
is some tendency to treat alike mortgage and conditional sale cases. See KEEroN, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 170-73. For the suggestion that the cases involving the sale of personal
property are "about equally divided," see In the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op, 165
F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958); 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 1380, 1381 (1959). But see Gillingham
v. Phelps, 5 Wash. 2d 410, 105 P.2d 825 (1940).
51. The maneuvering between carriers and shipper's insurers over this result
provides an interesting sidelight. See VANCE, INSURANCE 794-96 (3d ed. 1951); Note,
31 HARv. L. Rxv. 901 (1924).
52. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago Tunnell Terminal Co., 12 Ill. App.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
All too often the sole explanation advanced by opinions reaching
this result is the applicability of the doctrine of subrogation. Indeed,
where there is dispute on the matter today, it nearly always appears in
the narrow focus of whether the subrogation provision in the insurance
contract provides rights of that sort greater than those arising by
operation of law. 3 This rationale and this focus of dispute are un-
fortunate, for subrogation is merely a means to an end rather than al
end in itself. The basic issue is whether loss is to be ultimately allocated
to the third party rather than the insurer. If that question is affirmatively
answered, then subrogation is the process by which that allocation is
effected.
A doctrine originating in equity, "legal" subrogation is the product
of the more fundamental value judgment allocating loss between one
viewed as primarily and another thought to be only secondarily liable. 4
For example, subrogation of an insurer to the insured's right against a
tortfeasor must have -been based on the notion that the tortfeasor is
primarily liable because guilty of fault, while the insurer whose liability
rests only on contract is only secondarily liable.5 It was Professor
Langamid's inability to find "fault" in absolute or derivative liability
cases which led to his proposal that the subrogation result be replaced
by an apportionment solution of such problems. 6 Mr. King's more recent
proposal of apportionment between insurers and third parties who are
guilty of no more than ordinary negligence follows the same line of
reasoning-that the degree of "fault" in such cases does not justify the
"primarily liable" characterization." This challenge to "legal" subroga-
tion is strengthened if, as has been suggested, tort liability has taken on
a purely compensatory function.
Justification of subrogation of the insurer of a mortgagee to the
latter's rights against the mortgagor is somewhat more difficult, for
the element of fault disappears here. One explanation of the applicability
2d 539, 139 N.E.2d 770 (1958) (lessor's insurer subrogated against lessee); Nobbe v.
Equity Fire Ins. Co., 210 Minn. 93, 297 N.W. 349 (1941) (insurer of holder of mechanic's
lien subrogated against owner and therefore his insurer); Standard Acc. Ins. Co.
v. Pellechia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954) (trust company's surety subrogated
against guaranteeing bank); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Mogan, 186 Ore. 285, 206 P.2d
963 (1949) (bailor's insurer subrogated against bailee).
53. See, e.g., Fields v. Western Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 209, 48
N.E.2d 489 (1943) (denying subrogation).
54. See Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MIcir. L.
REv. 841 (1962).
55. Campbell, supra note 48, at 76-77.
56. Langmaid, Some Recent Sucbrogation Problems it; the Law of Suretyship and
Insurance, 47 HAsv. L. REv. 976, 988 (1934).
57. King, Subrogation under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 62,
64-65 (1951).
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of subrogation, however, is that the mortgagor typically has possession
or control of the property and is therefore in a better position to avoid
loss. Another is that the mortgagor's obligation is independent of and
antecedent to the loss, the fortuitous occurrence of which ought not alter
his duty to pay. Undoubtedly the "personal contract" concept has also
been a factor," although it would seem that, if sound, the doctrine has
potentially more general application.
All of these arguments can be made to support subrogation against
chattel mortgagors and conditional sale or installment purchasers. De-
cisions in such categories are not uniform, however. 9 The possession or
control and personal contract arguments, at least, are applicable also
where the third party is a bailee or tenant. Only the personal contract
argument, however, seems germane when the third party is a landlord,
and subrogation is usually denied here."
It thus becomes apparent why American courts, except in the
mortgage cases, have been traditionally reluctant to permit subrogation
to contract rights. The justification for characterization of the third
party as primarily liable in such cases simply grows weaker and weaker
until it rests on nothing firmer than "personal contract."
Yet there is another, independent approach to the question which
may be used to rationalize a subrogation result even when the third party
cannot be classified as primarily liable. It is the argument, usually
denominated "conventional" subrogation, that the subrogation clause of
the insurance contract may, without more, require that result.6 To
elaborate, the insured is the owner of a potentially valuable right against
a third party. If he chooses to assign that right to the insurer in partial
payment for insurance coverage (the premium supplies the remainder),
he should be allowed to do so. Essentially, it is a freedom-of-contract
argument. It might have met with immediate objection were assignment
of tort claims involved, but they, already covered by "legal" subrogation,
are not.
58. Actually it is the personal contract argument which seems to have been most
regularly used to justify the subrogation result. See 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 27.5 (1943).
59. Compare Interstate Ice & Power Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243
N.Y. 95, 152 N.E. 476 (1926), with Eastern Restaurant Equip. Co. v. Tecci, 196
N.E.2d 869 (Mass. 1964) (contract authorized vendor to insure at the expense of
purchaser), and In the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal.
1958). See King, supra note 3, at 82-83; Young, supra note 29, at 1074-75.
60. E.g., Plate Glass U. M. Ins. Co. v. Ridgewood Realty Co., 219 Mo. App. 186,
269 S.W. 659 (1925).
61. See Kimball & Davis, supra note 1, at 860-68. A number of courts in the
process of denying subrogation, have suggested that a policy provision calling for
subrogation under the circumstances might have produced a different answer. See In
the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958) ; Fields v. Western
Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 209, 48 N.E.2d 489 (1943).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In a, recent article Professor Kimball suggests increased insurer
interest in "conventional" subrogation. 2 This is not surprising for
insurers have much to gain and nothing to lose from its recognition.
An alliance of "legal" and "conventional" subrogation would provide
uniform allocation of loss to the third party, for the insurer in large
measure dictates the terms of the insurance contract. What is perhaps
more important is the indication of judicial receptivity to conventional
subrogation. Traditionally, American courts have concluded that the
subrogation provision of the insurance contract confers no rights which
did not accrue without it-that the provision simply makes explicit that
which was implicit. 8
To accept conventional subrogation on the ground of freedom of
contract constitutes, as did allocation of loss according to the choice of
the insured, an abandonment of the power to control loss allocation.
It puts the matter entirely into the hands of insured and insurer,
realistically into the hands of the latter. It allocates loss to the third
party not because the court believes it should fall there, but because
insured and insurer have agreed on that allocation. The agreement
of those parties should be controlling only if the court truly is indifferent
to the allocation problem. Freedom of contract is always subject to over-
riding public policy; surely loss allocation is a matter of this scope.
To object to conventional subrogation is not to reject ultimate allocation
of loss to the third party. It merely permits retention of the allocation
problem in the realm of judicial control.
Within that realm, however, there are objections to allocation of
loss to the third party and therefore to subrogation by operation of law.
One of these, that subrogation is a windfall to the insurer, has already
been discussed. 4 And even if it could be established that subrogation
has been a windfall in the past, that argument is not dispositive. Surely
subrogation savings could be passed on to insureds, if not by initial
reduction of premiums, by dividends or credits against ensuing premiums
on a ratable basis.
Perhaps a more practical and therefore more serious objection to
allocation of loss to the third party is one posed by the process rather than
the result. Subrogation creates pitfalls for the insured. If not avoided
with care, these may leave him with less than indemnification, a startling
conclusion when it is considered that he starts with multiple sources of
indemnification. Release or discharge of the third party by the insured
62. Kimball & Davis, supra note 54, at 844.
63. Cf. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 150-51 (2d ed. 1957); Kimball
& Davis, supra note 54, at 860.
64. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
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destroys the insurer's right of subrogation. Almost uniformly, destruc-
tion of that right provides the insurer with an absolute defense to an
action on the policy if the proceeds have not already been paid."5 And
if they have been paid, in most jurisdictions the insurer is allowed to
recoup that payment from the insured.66 Obviously, unless the insured
released or discharged the third party only after being totally compensated
by him, that act leaves him with less than total indemnification. In
several jurisdictions this harsh doctrine has been softened, at least where
the insurer has already paid and is seeking to recover back, by requiring
that the insurer show that it is prejudiced by loss of the right." This
approach, however, is somewhat ambiguous. What must the insurer
show? That it would have recovered $X from the third party which
entails proof of third-party liability? Subrogation claims are settled
or compromised just as any others. Lack of clarity as to what must be
proved, as well as difficulties as to how an agreed-upon element could be
proved in litigation between insured and insurer, has led to rejection
of this modification of the rule."8
Operation of the destruction rule can be softened in other ways.69
Two possibilities are briefly suggested: (1) a distinction might be
drawn between intentional and unintentional (as to fact of release)
releases; (2) the insurer might be required as a condition of avoiding
liability or of recovering back on this ground to take certain steps to
adequately warn the insured of the pitfall. A combination of pre-loss
warning when the policy is issued and regularly thereafter and of post-
loss warning on receipt of notice of loss would surely be helpful, although
it would not necessarily eliminate the danger.
It is at least arguable that the pitfall objection is an inadequate
one. Perhaps the insured deserves this fate if he tampers with the means
purposefully established for accomplishing a chosen allocation of loss."
65. PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 63, at 149; 2 RiCHARDS, INSURANCE § 196 (5th
ed. 1952); VANCE, INSURANCE 793-94 (3d ed. 1951).
66. E.g., City of New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Abraham, 20 So. 2d 183 (La. App.
1944) ; Illinois Auto Ins. Exch. v. Braun, 280 Pa. 550, 124 Atl. 691 (1924).
67. E.g., Washing-ton Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 233 Miss. 33, 100
So.2d 852 (1958); Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N.Y. 162, 158 N.E. 60
(1927). Cf. Century Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 17 N.J. Misc. 229, 8 A.2d 191 (1939). This
approach lessens the dimensions of the insured's danger but does not eliminate it.
6S. E.g., Rogers v. American Fidel. & Cas. Co., 52 N.J. Super. 254, 145 A.2d 344(1958).
69. The rule has already been qualified so that the insurer's subrogation claim
against a third party is not destroyed when the latter obtained the release from the
insured with knowledge of the right. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. James, 236 S.C. 431, 114
S.E.2d 832 (1960).
70. This argument presupposes that the purpose of subrogation is more than
prevention of double recovery by the named insured. That premise is confirmed by
cases which leave the insured without full indemnification because of his destruction
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F. A Category-by-Category Approach
These, then, are the alternatives and the arguments for and against
them with an indication of their judicial following. In view of the
objectionable features of each of the five solutions, it is hardly surprising
that different jurisdictions have disagreed about similar cases. In-
dividual judges and courts, as well as commentators, are likely to be
variably impressed by the different arguments.7 ' It is no less surprising
that within a single jurisdiction decisions adopting now one solution and
now another are reached." Confronted with the conflict a court quite
naturally seeks additional guidelines; the result is categorization based
on factual difference. Thus, in one state a third-party tortfeasor or
mortgagor may be required to bear the loss through application of the
subrogation-result, while his counterpart, a tenant or purchaser of realty,
gets the benefit of insurance procured by the landlord or vendor.
Factual distinction, of course, is not peculiar to this problem. And
it would seem a perfectly valid approach if the factual differences are
at the same time real and relevant. Often it seems they are not. Perhaps
the best example of unreal distinction appears in a contrast of the
mortgage and sale-of-realty cases. Where the insured is a mortgagee
and the third party a mortgagor, loss is placed almost uniformly on the
latter by subrogation of the mortgagee's insurer to the mortgagee's rights
against the mortgagor.78 On the other hand, in most jurisdictions a
purchaser under an executory contract for the sale of realty is given the
benefit of the vendor's insurance, i.e., loss is allocated to the insurer .7
Yet the two cases are remarkably alike. In both the liability of the
third party is contractual and is antecedent to and independent of the
insured event. In both the third party has, in addition to an interest
based on legal liability, a property interest of his own which would
of the subrogation right. See, e.g., Rogers v. American Fidel. & Cas. Co., 52 N.J.
Super. 254, 145 A.2d 344 (1958) ; 2 RiCHARDS, INSURANCE § 196 (5th ed. 1952).
71. Compare, e.g., Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925),
with Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1942).
72. Conpare Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 App. Div.
346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948) (insured
tenant receives double recovery), zath Fields v. Western Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
290 N.Y. 209, 48 N.E.2d 489 (1943) (denying subrogation but suggesting that
mortgagee's insurer could be subrogated to mortgagee's rights against mortgagor if
policy contained subrogation clause), and Palisano v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co.,
193 Misc. 647, 84 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1948), eff d, 276 App. Div. 523, 95 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1950)
(insurer's payment of mortgagee discharges mortgagor).
73. See note 49 supra. Extensive use of "loss payable" or "standard" mortgagee
endorsements appended to the mortgagor's policy provides coverage of both parties.
See, e.g., National Reserve Ins. Co. v. McCrory, 160 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942) ; VANCE, INSURANCE 773-74 (3d ed. 1951).
74. See note 25 sup ra.
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support insurance at full value and which survives the contractual
liability.
Why are different results reached? To say that the doctrine of
equitable conversion, applicable to the sale of realty but not the
mortgage cases, requires the dichotomy is not enough. That doctrine is,
after all, only a legal fiction providing the original basis for assessment
of risk of loss to the purchaser. Risk of loss is on the mortgagor who
owns the equity of redemption without the necessity of a fiction. Perhaps
it can be argued that the usually short duration of the vendor-purchaser
relationship when contrasted with the ordinarily longer mortgage period
justifies different treatment;"5 it may seem unreasonable to expect the
purchaser to get insurance so quickly. But the time element is a variable.
In a given case the mortgagor may be as much a newcomer to the property
as the purchaser and the duration of the mortgage period shorter-lived
than that of the executory contract. Surely, if time has this significance,
it should be examined case-by-case to see whether the third party at the
time of loss had had a reasonable opportunity to insure. Still another
ground of distinction may be possession."6 The mortgagor is more apt
to have possession than the purchaser and, on that account, he may be
more obviously responsible for loss. The likelihood, however, is not by
any means a certainty. Again, if possession is pivotal, inquiry ought
to be made case-by-case and the decision should not be reached on
generalities.
Given the different treatment of these cases, how do we deal with
controversies in a third and related category, the sale of personalty? Is
the buyer to be given the benefit of the conditional vendor's insurance
or must he bear the loss by operation of subrogation? Probably a
majority of decisions have reached the latter result." Obviously, the
problem is strikingly similar to both the mortgage and sale of realty
problems and accentuates the fact that different treatment of those cases
involves inconsistency.
That inconsistency has been noted elsewhere and the suggestion has
been made that the mortgage cases should be decided as are sale of
realty problems.7 This would eliminate the inconsistency difficulty with-
out resolving another. If both cases are to be treated alike, perhaps it
is the subrogation result that should apply. This would avoid the "per-
75. In the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958);
Langmaid, supra note 56, at 993.
76. See 72 HARV. L. REv. 138 (1959).
77. See note 50 supra.
78. King, supra note 57, at 76. Cf. Buckner v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 209 N. C. 640,
184 S.E. 520 (1936).
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sonal contract" objection, for example. 9 But is it really desirable for
the purchaser of realty to bear the loss, or do we really want the
mortgagor to have the benefit of mortgagee's insurance? Are the distinc-
tions relevant in the sense that they accomplish what is sought in the
best possible way?
III. THESIS
Although these cases arise in very different factual contexts, they
alike pose the insurance problem initially stated. Neither the difficulties
with the competing solutions nor the factual variations necessarily end
a quest for uniform treatment of that question. It is the thesis of this
article that, with one exception, its appropriate solution is ultimate alloca-
tion of loss to the third party by means of subrogation. Double recovery
violates the principle of indemnity which is fundamental to property
insurance law. In addition to the weaknesses already noted, the other
solutions wholly, partially or irregularly reallocate risk of loss between
the insured and the third party simply because of the insurance by giving
the third party the benefit of the insurance. The exceptional case is that
in which the third party has explicitly contributed to the cost of the
insurance; no reallocation of risk there results from giving the third party
the benefit of the insurance. This thesis does not involve the conclusion
that the insurance factor lacks significance. It is of great relevance; but
the appropriate juncture for its consideration is at the point of initially
fixing risk of loss between the insured and the third party. Once that
risk has been rationally allocated with due regard for the insurance
factor, the presence or absence of insurance should not bear on allocation
of loss.
A. Reallocation of Risk of Loss
By definition the insurance problem is limited to cases where,
absent insurance, the law puts risk of loss on the third party."s To give
79. One court, allowing a conditional vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance,
concluded that this factor was of less significance than "equitable considerations
favoring the vendee." In the Matter of Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D.
Cal. 1958).
80. This is an oversimplification only to the extent that, where a third party
under no legal obligation has indemnified the named insured, a comparable problem
may arise. In such a case the insured has been denied further recovery from his
insurer. Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928).
This position can be sustained on the technical ground that the insurer was denied its
option to itself replace or repair. 221 N.W. at 655. The court also justified the result
on the ground that the insured sustained no loss. The latter theory prevents double
recovery, and the relationship of the third party to the property can be used to
distinguish the gift cases. Contra, Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 159 (7th Cir.
1959) (condemnee entitled to insurance proceeds although compensated by condemnor
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him the benefit of the insurance reallocates risk of loss to the insured
solely because the latter has insurance. More accurately, it puts risk of
loss on all those insureds covered by the particular insurer against the
same kind of loss, but the reallocation effect is the same whether insureds
are viewed individually or collectively.81 An insurance contract does not
shift loss or the risk thereof from the named insured to the insurer.
Rather, it distributes loss and risk among all of those insured. They pay
regular premiums which are the source from whence the individual
insureds who actually suffer loss are indemnified. To an insured, then,
the premium is simply a substitute for loss.8 It is a desirable substitute
because it is an easier burden to bear than loss itself, but it is a burden
nonetheless. To give the third party, who is otherwise liable, the benefit
of the insurance is to put the burden of the loss, through the burden
of the premium-substitute, on the insured. It is effectively a reallocation
between the insured and the third party of loss or risk of loss.
Not only does this reallocation occur when the third party is given
the full benefit of the insurance, but it also takes place for the same
reasons, although only partially, when loss is apportioned between insurer
and third party. In reality loss is apportioned between the insured and
the third party. The apportionment solution was criticized as a com-
promise;3 it is a compromise on risk of loss. The allocation of loss to
insurer or third party at the election of the insured approach produces
the same result when the insured selects his insurer as the loss-bearer.
The election-by-the-insured result takes the question of risk of loss from
the courts and vests it in the individual insured.8"
This reallocation does not occur when the insured is allowed a
double recovery. That result, however, clearly violates the indemnity
principle. That principle seems too fundamental to the law of insurance,
indeed to private law generally, to be ignored. Nor does reallocation
follow from the subrogation result. The insured does not lose from
allocation of loss to the third party. He stands to gain if his premiums
presently reflect subrogation recoveries, as is claimed, or are made to
which might have abandoned condemnation after the fire). In such a case the reasons
urged herein for ultimate allocation of loss to the third party have no application.
Therefore, no reason can be found why the insured should not recover from the
insurer, the recovery being impressed with a constructive trust for the benefit of the
third party.
81. The fact that loss is reallocated to all insureds provides an additional basis
for objection to allocation at the election of the insured. It is one thing to permit him
an election against his own interest; it is quite a different matter to vest in him the
power to prejudice co-insureds.
82. MoWBRAY & BLANCHAMD, INSURANcE 25-26 (5th ed. 1961).
83. See text accompanying notes 24-34 supra.
84. See note 81 supra.
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reflect them, as is dearly possible. There the third party ultimately bears
the loss, and to that extent the burden of carrying insurance is reduced.
B. The Exception: Where the Third Party Contributes to the Cost
Reallocation does not take place, of course, when the third party
contributes to the cost of any insurance protection from which he benefits.
Because uniform application of the subrogation result rests finally on
the reallocation argument," whether there has been such a contribution
becomes all-important.
The key to the answer does not lie in the basis of the third party's
liability to the insured; it requires a further examination of their rela-
tionship.86 Obviously there is no contribution when the sole link between
them is that the third party caused the loss. Even in retrospect the
appropriate size of a third-party contribution would be impossible to
compute. The only possible source of contribution appears to be in the
consideration flowing between the parties when they are tied by contract.
Within that seemingly narrow framework, however, two very nice
questions appear: Was there a contribution? Assuming a contribution,
was it adequate? The difficulties posed by the first of these questions
are probably enough to deny the third party the benefit of insurance
in the absence of an explicitly contracted-for contribution.
Again the mortgage case is illustrative. Arguably, the funds with
which a mortgagee insures come from the mortgagor's interest payment.
They must if the mortgagee is to profit from the transaction. This argu-
ment might be buttressed by a citation of those decisions refusing to
increase the mortgage debt by insurance costs of the mortgagee, 7
although it seems more likely that such decisions are a product of the
usual view that such insurance is for the sole benefit of the mortgagee.
On the other hand, it is just as likely that the interest rate for the
85. It has been suggested that an additional reason for denying the third party the
benefit of the insurance is to avoid an increase of risk to the insurer. Young, Some
"Windfall Coverage" in Property and Liability Insurance, 60 CoLUr. L. REv. 1063,
1064 (1960). The revenues of the insurer must at least equal losses sustained plus the
costs of administration. Premiums, the primary source of revenue, are computed on the
basis of predicted loss experience. MowBRAY & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 372-73 (5th ed.
1961). If protection of the third party's liability interest increases the risk and
therefore losses, the security of the entire plan is threatened. The threat may be more
apparent than real since the insurer has assumed the risk of the named insured's loss for
which third parties are liable. Presumably the premium reflects that fact unless it has
been adjusted for subrogation recoveries. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
86. See Mackaman, Subrogation}: A Landlord-Tenant Problem, 4 DRAIE L. REV.
79 (1955) (urging that a lessee be given the benefit of lessor's insurance). This is not
to be confused with Professor Young's suggestion that identification of the third
party's claim follows from the relationship. Young, supra note 85, at 1064-65.
87. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 336 (1951). Cf. Note, 33 ID. L.J. 397 (1958) (con-
tribution argument suggested in lease context).
ALLOCATION OF LOSS
mortgage loan is merely that prevailing in the area at the time, and
includes no contribution for insurance costs. This is supported by the
fact that quite often the mortgagor insures both inerests at his own
expense."8
Contribution to the cost of insurance becomes even less certain in
cases where all monetary consideration flows from the insured to the
third party. Where, for example, is there a contribution to the cost of a
bailor's insurance by a bailee to whom a storage fee is paid? Theoretically
the bailee might lower his fee when dealing with insured bailors. It
seems more likely, however, that included in his fee will be a charge for
the cost of his own liability coverage and, sometimes, for express cov-
erage of the bailor's property interest. 9
In sum the presence and amount of an other-than-explicitly con-
tracted-for contribution is too uncertain a matter on which to turn the
insurance problem in an individual case. It involves either detailed fact-
finding on a hazy question of intent of the parties or use of a presumption
one way or the other."0 The possibility of an implicit contribution is not
to be ignored entirely. Its relevance, however, is also greater in initial
allocation of risk of loss.
C. The Relevance of Insurance
The issue is not resolved against giving the third party the benefit
of the insurance simply by recognition of the fact that to do so reallocates
risk of loss between the insured and the third party. The question remains
whether such reallocation is appropriate.
Traditionally the courts have given a negative answer whenever
the problem has been expressly presented in terms of the appropriateness
of the reallocation. This has been especially true when the third party
88. A "loss payable" or "standard mortgagee" endorsement is used. See note 72
supra. Under the former the mortgagee is subject to the insurer's defenses against
the mortgagor; under the latter he is not. The "standard mortgagee" endorsement is
usually said to create an independent contract between mortgagee and insurer. VANCE,
INSURANCE 776 (3d ed. 1951). This theory has created some problems. See, e.g.,
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Eisenberg, 188 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (bailor allowed
recovery on that theory despite misrepresentations of bailee). Characterization of the
mortgagee as a third party beneficiary expressly freed by the policy from such defenses
might be more accurate and avoid some of these problems.
89. The bailee may insure for the benefit of his bailor. PAxrMSON, op. cil. supra
note 63, at 125. This is sometimes described as a representative interest. To label it a
distinct category of insurable interest seems superfluous. Cf. IK-ErON, BASIC INSURANCE
LAW 88 (1960).
90. See 34 CHIL-KENT L. REV. 259 (1956). Of course, where such a contribution
is e.%plicit the third party should be given the benefit of the insurahce. See, e.g.,
Pendleton v. Elliott, 67 Mich. 496 (1887) ; Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 164 N.Y.S.2d
732 (1957); Buckner v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 209 N. C. 640, 184 S.E. 520 (1936);
Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co. v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 192 Wis. 623, 213 NAy. 632(1927).
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was a tortfeasor.9 ' Insurance coverage of the injured party, however
complete, is no defense in the tort action. The same result prevails
when the third party is a mortgagor. Probably the rationale most com-
monly encountered is that a contrary result penalizes the providence of
the insured and unjustly enriches the third party. Such reasoning, how-
ever, no more than restates the effect of the contrary result-reallocation
of risk.
In all events the command of history, even if dear, would not be
inexorable. The possibility of change is evidenced, for example, by
subsections 2-510 (2) and (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code,
where insurance of the buyer and seller, respectively, produces realloca-
tion of risk, as well as by judicial decisions in other fields. Increased
interest in insurance treatment of losses has been generated by highway
accidents and employee injuries. The novelty of compulsory automobile
liability insurance and workman's compensation92 has worn off, but the
insurance treatment of those problems suggests the wisdom of fresh
examination of the handling of property losses.
The argument for giving the third party the benefit of another's
insurance, even at the expense of reallocation of risk, must ultimately
stand on the desirability of risk distribution through insurance as a means
of absorbing property losses.93 Essentially, the justification of risk
distribution is that loss, a substantial and often overwhelming burden
on the individual, becomes no more than a tolerable expense when spread
among a sufficiently large group. And that spreading process, of course,
is the function of insurance if it is to be accomplished privately. In-
surance is a means by which individuals may join to share losses oc-
curring at random within the group.9" Its use, voluntarily or otherwise,
is increasingly popular.
In only one area is risk distribution by insurance or any other means
currently deemed undesirable. Intentional misconduct is usually thought
to be best discouraged by requiring the wrongdoer to bear individually
loss caused thereby. Accordingly, liability for intentional misconduct is
91. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 25.22 (1956); MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 324-25(1935).
92. In neither compulsory automobile liability insurance or workmen's compensation
is loss reallocated because of insurance. Compulsory automobile liability insurance is
paid for by those who would be liable in tort. GREGORY & KALvEN, CASES ON TORTS
725-42 (1959). Workmen's compensation is paid for by employers because it is be-
lieved that employee injury is an inevitable incident and therefore legitimate burden
of enterprise. Id. at 710-24; PROSSm, TORTS 382-83 (2d ed. 1955).
93. This is the acknowledged justification of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-510
(2)-(3).
94. MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 25-26 (5th ed. 1961).
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ordinarily uninsurable.05 It follows then that allocation of loss by means
of subrogation to the third party guilty of intentional wrong is appro-
priate.
With that exception, however, the third party's liability in all our
cases is an insurable one. It is therefore permissible that his risk of
liability be distributed in order to avoid the possibly oppressive imposition
of loss on him individually. The question remains whether the desir-
ability of risk distribution creates a pressure strong enough to justify
reallocation of risk between the insured and the third party. Clearly the
answer to this question may vary with factual context. One might be
willing on this basis to reallocate risk where the third party is con-
tractually liable, but reluctant to do so when he is a tortfeasor. Evaluation
of such a matter is not, properly speaking, a question of insurance law
at all. These are problems of the substantive law of real property, torts,
sales, etc. To label them as noninsurance questions is not to deny that
they must be answered and that the answers need constant reexamination.
But the labeling process is nonetheless suggestive of something import-
ant; it indicates that the timing of the evaluation is material. What leads
to the thesis that the solution to the insurance problem first posed is
properly the subrogation result unless the third party has explicitly
contributed to the cost of insurance is the matter of timing. The appro-
priate point at which to weigh the desirability of risk distribution of
loss through insurance is at the initial, noninsurance stage of fixing
risk of loss. Once that risk has been fixed with due regard for risk
distribution, it should not be altered simply because one party is or is
not in fact insured. A rational allocation of risk which makes the third
party liable should be adhered to by means of the subrogation result.
Three considerations support this proposition. The first is that
juggling of allocation of risk because of the fact of insurance creates
uncertainty. Consider the case of the buyer of goods under section
2-510(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code. He is liable for loss or
damage to the property before delivery only if he commits a breach of
the contract and if the seller is wholly or partially uninsured. Should he
insure? The purchaser of realty faces a like question since in most
jurisdictions he is given the benefit of vendor's insurance. If buyer and
95. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949);
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952). Policy ex-
clusion from coverage of such conduct is common. Moreover, losses intentionally
produced by the insured cannot satisfy the usually stated requirement that the insured
event be fortuitous. MowivBAY & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 54 (5th ed. 1961).
96. Whether liability for gross negligence is insurable has been the subject of
debate. See PATMTESON & YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 318 (4th ed.
1961).
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purchaser insure because they are unwilling to take the risk and seller
and vendor, as it turns out, were insured, there will be over-insurance
of the property, a form of economic waste. That this uncertainty might
be eliminated in theory, if the parties have the foresight to contract
with regard to insurance,97 fails to recognize that this is not always
feasible. Had it been so section 2-510(3) of the Code would have been
unnecessary.
The problem of uncertainty is compounded if the law is unsettled.
The Code eliminates that problem for the buyer. The weight of judicial
authority may do so for the purchaser. But suppose the third party is
a tenant and the insured his landlord?" In some areas the law is
remarkably uncertain; the third party may be confronted with both
legal and factual doubts of considerable magnitude.
A second and more significant reason for insisting that the
desirability of risk distribution through insurance be considered at the
outset is that only at that juncture can it properly be weighed against
competing interests. Undoubtedly a rule initially assessing risk of loss
to the third party may be grounded on interests distinct from, although
not inconsistent with, indemnification of another. Tort liability, for
example, may have an admonitory as well as a compensatory feature
which is lost if the third-party tortfeasor is given the benefit of another's
insurance.99 Because one who has possession of property is often best
able to avoid loss of or damage to it, there may be advantages in
assessing risk of loss to a third party, such as a mortgagor, in possession.
Attempted weighing of the competing interests governing risk of loss
in all the cases in which the common insurance problem is posed is
beyond the scope of this article. It is worth remarldng, however, that
in the two cases just cited both the competing interest and risk distribu-
tion may be given effect by a rule allocating loss to a third party who
97. If the parties contract with reference to insurance of the property, either
release of the third party or express contribution by him to the cost of insurance
seems probable. See General Mills, Inc. v. Goldman, 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950)
(lease absolved tenant from liability); Buckner v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 640,
184 S.E.2d 520 (1936) (mortgagor given benefit of coverage since, under terms of
mortgage, chargeable with mortgagee's insurance costs).
98. See King, supra note 57, at 81. Cases adopting the subrogation result are
regularly found. E.g., Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans Ry. v. Pullman Southern
Car Co., 139 U.S. 79 (1891); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago Tunnell Terminal
Co., 12 Ill. App.2d 539, 139 N.E.2d 770 (1958); F.H. Vahlsing, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 108 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). For the view that there is a trend
toward construction of the lease exculpating the lessee and allocating loss to the
lessor's insurer, see Martin, Liability for Loss by Fire Among Insurer, Tenant and
Landlord, 18 OHiio ST. L.J. 423 (1957).
99. SALMOND, TORTS 21 (11th ed. 1953); PRoSsER, ToRTs 20 (2d ed. 1955).
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can insure against liability.' The third party's burden becomes his
liability insurance premium rather than the cost of the loss itself. In
some cases it may be impossible to reconcile the interests; in that event
the more important of the two should prevail. However, to reallocate
risk simply because the injured party is insured strips competing interests
of any weight and makes risk distribution the sole factor in decision.
Moreover, the risk distribution factor is one which itself changes
in weight in at least two respects which vary with the factual context.
The first is the likelihood of an implicit contribution by the third party
to the cost of insurance. The greater the likelihood of that contribution
the stronger will be the risk distribution interest. Consequently, the
argument for risk distribution is clearly weightier where the third party
is contractually linked to the insured. If there is monetary consideration
flowing from the third party, this interest is further strengthened. And,
since it is impossible at this juncture to determine whether there is
insurance, likelihood of insurance coverage by one party or the other is
important. Such considerations as commercial availability of insurance'"'
at reasonable rates and the relationship of the parties to the property
are obviously relevant.
It may be urged that this balancing process is so sensitive that to
insist upon it in the abstract, i.e., without knowing whether there will
in fact be insurance coverage of the property at all, deprives the court
of needed flexibility. For example, it might be argued that the position
of section 2-510(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code is sound-that
the competing arguments for assessing risk of loss to seller or buyer are
so closely balanced that the problem can only be resolved in light of
whether the seller is actually insured. It is clear, however, that this
argument necessitates the uncertainty and prevents true balancing of
competing interests. It carries with it an additional, self-contained diffi-
culty involving the third and final reason for the thesis of this article.
Although it seems to give primacy to the risk distribution interest, it
actually undermines that interest.
Reallocation of risk between parties simply because one of them is
insured may only obscure the need for a fundamental reexamination,
in the light of the desirability of risk distribution through insurance,
of the initial assignment of risk.102 A decision giving the third party the
100. But cf. 2 HARPm & JAMEs, TORTS § 25.23 (1956) (discussing social in-
surance).
101. See Brewer, An Inductive Approach to the Liability of the Tenant for
Ncglgence, 31 B.U.L. REv. 47 (1951) (suggesting that a tenant finds insurance difficult
!o procure and that one solution is to absolve the tenant from liability for negligence).
102. One solution is "social insurance." See 2 HARPER & JAuEs, TORTS §§ 25.19-.23
(1956); GREG ORY & KAL E, op. cit. supra note 92, at 710-24, 743-86. Its utility has been
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benefit of insurance where he would otherwise be liable achieves dis-
tribution of the particular loss. It does no more than that, and it may
discourage efforts to do more. By means short of compulsory insurance,
risk distribution through insurance is most likely to follow the exertion
of pressure on a party to insure. That pressure is greatest where, by
allocation of risk, a party must absorb the loss individually if he does
not insure. Thus, initial rules fixing risk of loss may need reassessment
in terms of application of such pressure to the appropriate party as a
means of achieving more widespread distribution of loss. It seems
likely that a number of current rules governing risk allocation need
such a reexamination. Many were formulated at a time when the
relevance of risk distribution was not recognized and have remained
undisturbed despite growing awareness of that element.
D. An Illstration
The sale of realty case supplies a relatively simple illustration of
this thesis. A decision giving the purchaser the benefit of vendor's
insurance, i.e., placing the loss on the insurer where the purchaser would
bear the loss in the absence of insurance, seems a desirable solution of
the controversy immediately before the court. The loss is thus distributed
in society rather than being placed solely on the purchaser. At the same
time the result quite dearly reallocates the risk from the purchaser to
the insured vendor who paid the insurance premium and who thus, with
other insured owners, paid for the loss. Of course it is possible that the
vendor has recouped his insurance costs through the purchase price, but
in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the sale contract
there is no certainty that he has done so.
Yet, if distribution of loss through insurance is of sufficient import-
ance to justify this reallocation, the decision is incomplete. It puts no
pressure, other than fear of the purchaser's insolvency, on the vendor
to insure. It may even tempt him to cancel existing insurance coverage
if he is satisfied that the purchaser is financially secure. Without in-
surance he will be indemnified for any loss by the purchaser; with
insurance any loss falls, at least indirectly, on him. Pressure to insure
or to remain insured can be exerted on the vendor, however, if risk of
loss is allocated to him so that insurance coverage is his only escape
from loss. Moreover, there are several factors that make it logical to put
this pressure to insure on the vendor rather than on the purchaser. The
suggested primarily with regard to industrial and highway accidents. The latter, of
course, often include some property losses. Despite the economic significance of
property losses generally, such an approach is not advocated here.
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cases which give the purchaser the benefit of vendor's insurance reflect
the fact that the vendor is more likely to be insured than the purchaser
because of his prior connection with the property, although, unlike
some of the other situations in which the problem arises, insurance
is readily available to the purchaser. At the same time the vendor is
in a position to require the purchaser to contribute to the cost of insurance
by adjustment of the purchase price; he has a means of insisting that
one with an economic interest in the property share the cost of protecting
that interest. Thus risk distribution is fostered, and comfortably so,
by allocation of risk to the vendor from the outset." 3
Are there competing considerations? Assuming first that the vendor
retains possession, there do not seem to be any such considerations unless
the purchaser causes the loss. If he does so intentionally, risk of course
should be assessed to him, and it is uninsurable. If loss is negligently
caused by the purchaser, probably he should bear the risk since it is his
conduct that has made the agreed exchange impossible.' There may
be some merit, however, in the argument that the purchaser should be
excused, or at least that the purchase price should be abated by the
amount of loss, since the vendor was in the better position to obtain
protection.
If the purchaser does take possession, there is a conflict of the
same sort when he also causes loss. There is also a conflict when he
does not cause the loss, for with possession comes the ability to take
steps to prevent loss. This ability, incidentally, may alter the risk from
the insurer's standpoint. More importantly, it may be argued that risk
should be allocated to the party in possession who is able to control the
property.' Does this factor override the insurance consideration? The
framers of the Uniform Vendor Purchaser Risk Act,0 6 engaging in
the kind of reexamination of risk allocation advocated here, apparently
103. An additional argument for assessing risk to the vendor, available where the
buildings are an important part of the bargained-for exchange, is impossibility. See
Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 Atl. 205 (1935).
104. This apparently is the position taken in the UNiFoRm VENDOR PURCHASER RIsK
ACT, 9C U.L.A. 314 (1957), which deals only with cases where the property "is destroyed
without fault of the purchaser."
105. See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRCrS § 942 (rev. ed. 1936).
106. Adopted in California (1947), Hawaii (1941), Illinois (1963), Michigan
(1941), New York (1936), North Carolina (1959), Oregon (1955), South Dakota
(1937) and Wisconsin (1941). 9C U.L.A. 131 (Supp. 1963). The moving force behind
the act was Professor Williston. Handbook of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws 204 (1934). The theoretical justification for assessing
risk to the purchaser only on transfer of title or possession is that this reflects the
parties' intention. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 940 (rev. ed. 1936). He argued that
insurance is the most important practical reason for leaving risk of loss on the vendor
in possession. Id. § 942.
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thought so. That legislation puts risk of loss on the vendor between
the time of contracting and transfer of title or change of possession,
whichever occurs first. Whether this act gives too much weight to the
possession or control factor may be debated. However, the apparent
subordination of the insurance consideration is not as drastic as may
appear. The assumption of possession may be thought of sufficient
moment to bring home to the purchaser the need for insurance protection
which is readily available to him.
In any event the decision is the result of a balancing of truly
competing interests, a process made impossible if the insurance element
is considered only where there actually is insurance when it is then
dispositive. The weighing of competing considerations is difficult,
but it should not be evaded on that ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
Treatment of these cases as involving merely issues of insurance
law has had unfortunate consequences. The debate about the competing
insurance solutions is in large measure misleading. In reality, the question
posed by each of these cases is one of risk of loss and should be resolved
in that light. Insurance stands as a significant factor in allocation of
risk of loss because it provides a means for distribution of losses. In
many instances this factor has not been given adequate consideration
in determining desirable allocation. To evaluate it properly, however,
the narrow insurance issue must be uniformly treated. Where risk of
loss has been allocated to the third party with due consideration of the
risk distribution factor, loss should be ultimately allocated to him even
when another is in fact insured. Only thus can the problem of loss
allocation be examined in its proper perspective.
